Lender Exposure under Sections 547 and 550: Are Outsiders Really Insiders by Friedman, Joseph A.
SMU Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 2 Article 7
1990
Lender Exposure under Sections 547 and 550: Are
Outsiders Really Insiders
Joseph A. Friedman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph A. Friedman, Lender Exposure under Sections 547 and 550: Are Outsiders Really Insiders, 44 Sw L.J. 985 (1990)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol44/iss2/7
COMMENT
LENDER EXPOSURE UNDER SECTIONS 547




EN a small closed corporation borrows money from a commer-
ia lender, the lender may ask a director, officer, or other person
involved in the control of the corporation to personally guarantee
its payment. I Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") permits the
corporation's bankruptcy trustee to avoid any payments on that debt re-
ceived by the lender on or within ninety days before the corporation files for
bankruptcy 2 as preferential.3 A controversial problem arises with respect to
those payments occuring between one year and ninety days before the corpo-
ration files for bankruptcy. 4 When transfer takes place within one year of
the petition filing, the trustee may be able avoid the transfer 5 as preferential
1. The Code defines an insider as: (B) if the debtor is a corporation--(i) director of the
debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control of the debtor; . . . (vi) relative of a
general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor; ... 11 U.S.C. § 101 (30)(B)
(1988). For a discussion of the debate over special legal treatment of closed corporations, see
Fessler, The Fate of Closely Held Business Associations: The Debateable Wisdom of "Incorpora-
tion", 13 U. CAL. DAvIs L. REV. 473 (1980); Rosenberry, Traditional Corporate Concepts in
Light of Demands for Elastic Norms for the Family or Closely Held Corporation, 5 J. CORP. L.
455 (1980).
2. These payments are considered a transfer. Transfer means every mode, direct or indi-
rect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an inter-
est in property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's
equity or redemption. 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988).
The definition of transfer is derived and adapted, with stylistic changes, from section 1(30)
of the Bankruptcy Act [former section 1(30) of this title]. Although a transfer involves the
disposition of an interest in property, the definition of transfer is interpreted as broadly as
possible. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 27 (1978); see Katz v. First Nat'l Bank, 568
F.2d 964 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
3. The trustee may avoid the transfer, assuming that the debtor company was insolvent
during the entire year preceding the payment and the debtor had not made payment. Conse-
quently, an insider would receive less than 100 cents on the dollar under a liquidation of the
company under chapter 7 of the Code.
4. See infra notes 125-231 and accompanying text.
5. The power to avoid is defined as the power to terminate the property interest held by
entities other than the debtor in assets that belonged to the bankrupt previous to the filing of
bankruptcy but were transferred away or were included as property of the estate. See Jackson,
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under section 547(b)(4)(B) because the guarantor is considered an insider by
benefitting, albeit indirectly, from the company's repayment. 6 After avoid-
ing the transfer under section 547, the trustee must file suit to exercise the
power accorded under section 550 to bring the transfer property back to the
debtor's estate. 7 The majority of courts have held that the trustee may re-
cover the transfer from an insider pursuant to section 550(a)(1). 8
In the case of outside lenders, however, a majority of bankruptcy courts
have not allowed the trustee to recover transfers under section 550, citing
equity grounds. 9 Engaging in a literal reading of the statute, recent courts of
Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 725 n.1 (1984). Additional avoidance
powers of the trustee include: 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988) ("the strong arm clause"); id § 545
(statutory liens); id § 548 (fraudulent conveyances); id. § 549 (post petition set-offs); id
§ 553(b) (set-offs); and id. § 724(a) (certain avoidable liens). The trustee has the burden of
proving the avoidability of a transfer under § 547(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1988).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988) reads in pertinent part:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of the section, the trustee may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made--
(A) on or within ninety days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if such a creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would re-
ceive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by
the provisions of this title.
In this example, the payments to the lender were for the benefit of the insider because the
corporation's payments to the bank diminished the insider's contingent liability. Similarly,
under § 547(b)(1), an insider is a creditor of the debtor company, as defined by 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(9)(A) (1988), by virtue of holding a contingent claim against the company for any pay-
ments the insider made on behalf of the company. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In
re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.) 874 F.2d 1186, 1189-91 (7th Cir. 1989). But see Borowitz,
Waving Suborgation Rights and Conjuring Up Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW.
2152, 2155-65 (1990) (discussing effectiveness of insider's waiver of suborgation rights in favor
of outside lender to avoid Deprizio result).
7. Section 550 also allows the recovery of transfers under any of the other avoidance
sections mentioned supra note 5. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
8. The courts allowed trustees to recover transfers from an insider because the insider is
"an entity for whose benefit [the] transfer was made." 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). See Ray v.
City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1492 (6th Cir. 1990); Levit v.
Ingersall Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1194 ( 7th Cir.
1989); Manufactures Leasing Corp. v. Lowery (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 97 Bankr
77, 79-80 (W.D. Olka. 1988) aff'd 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).
9. See, e.g., Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n (In re Midwestern Co.), 96
Bankr. 224, 225 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (preference action is creature of equity and bank-
ruptcy courts applying the doctrine should apply equitable provisions), aff'd 102 Bankr. 169
(W.D. Mo. 1989); Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 70 Bankr. 928, 934
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (following majority rule rejecting literal interpretation); In re Aerco
Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77, 81-82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (restricting recovery of trustee
from insider on equitable grounds). See also, Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corrugated Box Corp.
(In re Mercon Indust., Inc.), 37 Bankr. 549, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (denying recovery to
trustee on grounds of indirect/direct transfer analysis).
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appeals decisions, on the other hand, have allowed recovery from an outside
lender.' 0 Like the courts, commentators also disagree on the issue."
This Comment argues that the recovery of a transfer made pursuant to a
debtor's note to an outside lender, personally guaranteed by a debtor's in-
sider, is improper under section 547(b). 12 In so doing, this Comment exam-
ines the history of preference law to extract its underlying policy and
purpose and discusses the changes surrounding preference recovery brought
about by the 1978 Act and 1984 amendments. 13 Next, the discussion turns
to the three judicial approaches to recovery from outsiders under section
547: the equitable approach, the literal approach, and the two transfer ap-
proach. 14 Finally, in light of the policy behind preference recovery and the
rules of statutory construction, this Comment proposes a statutory reading,
which would allow an outside creditor to defend against recovery based on
the lender's status as an outsider, in contrast to past rationale which depends
upon the equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts. 15
II. HISTORY OF PREFERENCE LAW
Early English law viewed bankrupt debtors as frauds, and consequently,
10. Eg., Ray v. City Bank & Trust (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1495 (6th
Cir. 1990); Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.) 97 Bankr. 77, 82
(W.D. Okla. 1988), aff'd sub. nom., Manufactures Handover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey, 892
F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co.),
874 F.2d 1186, 1195-96 (7th Cit. 1989).
11. Compare KING, 4 COLLIERS ON BANKRUPTCY 550.02 (15th ed. 1987) and Coun-
tryman, The Trustee's Recovery in Preference Actions, 3 BANKR. DEV. J. 449, 464 (1986) (both
arguing against trustee's recovery from outsiders) with Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference
Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c)(2), 550(a)(1), and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. LAW. 175, 186-
99 (1985) and Pitts, Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343
(1981) (both answering for trustee's recovery from outsiders).
A third approach suggests that the release of the outside creditor should be conditioned
upon the solvency of the insider. Only when the estate is protected should the court release the
outsider. P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: BANKRUPTCY LAW § 9.03
(1985 & Supp. 1988),
Well established law exists, however, indicating that the insider as guarantor is a creditor.
Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V. N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1191
(7th Cir. 1989); Paper v Stem, 198 F. 642 (8th Cir. 1912). See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) and § 101(9)
(1988) (defining claim and creditor). Legislative history indicates that a guarantor is a creditor
because "[the creditor] will hold a contingent claim against the debtor that will become fixed
when he pays the creditor whose claim he had guaranteed or insured." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 310, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6266-67.
See also 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(2) (1988) (allowance of claims against guarantors); S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. at 22, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5808
(guarantor or surety for claim against debtor is a creditor).
12. See infra notes 234-76 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 16-121 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 125-231.
15. The creditor or party in interest can defend itself against the trustee under § 547(c).
These defenses include 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988) (contemporaneous exchange); id.
§ 547(c)(2) (ordinary course of business); id. § 547(c)(3) (enabling loan); id § 547(c)(4) (future
advances); id. § 547(c)(5) (working capital financing); id. § 547(c)(6) (unavoidable statutory
lien); id. § 547(c)(7) (de minimis consumer transfer). But see CHG Int'l, Inc. v. Barclays Bank
(Matter of CHG Int'l, Inc.), 897 F.2d 1479, 1482-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding payments made
by debtors on long-term loans not included in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) exception for payments
made in the ordinary course of business).
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English courts tightly linked the concept of preferences to fraud. 16
Although United States preference law evolved from an English origin, to-
day's United States law is quite different.17 Nonetheless, to fully understand
the modem policy behind United States preference law, a brief summary its
English background is useful. I s
A. English History
The transfer of property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud credi-
tors has been illegal since the early days of English bankruptcy law. 19 Mere
preferences were originally legal because the antecedent debt served as ade-
quate consideration. 20 As English bankruptcy law began to seek an equal
division of the estate among all creditors, preferences increasingly became a
focus of the law.2I The early statutes making preferential transfers criminal,
failed to provide for the return of the property to the estate. 22
In The Case of the Bankrupts23 the court held the debtor's non-fraudulent
delivery of all of his goods to one creditor following an act of bankruptcy,
void against the commissioners.24 The commissioners, thus, could validly
pass the goods to a new purchaser. 25 In addition to outlining the commis-
sioners' distribution powers, Lord Coke issued the ruling because of the
commissioners' power to effect equal distribution of a debtor's estate. 26
Generally, title vested in the commissioners upon bankruptcy, and the com-
missioners could recover any property transferred after bankruptcy to effect
16. McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L.
REv. 249, 250 (1981). For a more complete discussion of the development of bankruptcy law
in England, see Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1919).
17. Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV.
713, 713-14 (1985). See also MOORE & KING, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.04 (14th ed.
1978).
18. See infra notes 15-40 and accompanying text.
19. Countryman, supra note 17, at 714. The modem version of this law can be found in
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (UFTA), 7A U.L.A. SuPp. 67 (1985). See also, Clark,
The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977) (analyzing
policy behind fraudulent conveyance law and related issues of equitable subordination doc-
trine, piercing the corporate veil, and dividend restraint statutes).
20. See MOORE & KING, supra note 17, 60.04 at 767.
21. Id.
22. McCoid, supra note 16, at 252. In addition to imprisonment under An Act against
such Persons as do make Bankrupt, 1542-43, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c.4 and An Act touching Orders
for Bankrupts, 1570, 13 Eliz., c. 7, §§ 5, 6, punishment also included lock up in the pillory and
loss of an ear. See An Act for the further Description of a Bankrupt, and Relief of Creditors
against such as Shall become Bankrupts, and for inflicting corporal Punishment upon the
Bankrupts in some special Cases, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, § 7 as noted in McCoid, supra note 16,
at 251 n. 14.
23. 76 Eng. Rep. 441 (K.B. 1584).
24. The commissioners were an early English form of trustees empowered to distribute
the bankrupt's estate. See Countryman, supra note 17, at 716.
25. 76 Eng. Rep at 474.
26. 76 Eng. Rep. at. 463-64. The court noted that the commissioners had the power "to
make disposition ... to everyone of the creditors a portion, rate and rate alike, according to
the quantity of their debts.' " Id. This theory of recapture is stated in the rule that the com-
missioners' title relates back to the act of bankruptcy. See 3 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND
661 (4th ed. 1973).
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equal distribution of the estate. 27
The courts took nearly 200 years to recognize the recapture of pre-bank-
ruptcy preferential transfers. 28 In Alderson v. Temple29 Lord Mansfield held
fraudulent and void as to other creditors, a transfer by the debtor on the eve
of bankruptcy, outside the normal course of business. 30 Lord Mansfield did
not, however, declare all preferences void. 31 Instead, Lord Mansfield fo-
cused upon the debtor's actions and held permissible the debtor's non-fraud-
ulent preference made under the threat of suit or other legal action against
the debtor. 32 Lord Mansfield continued, stating that if the debtor volunta-
rily transferred the property the preference was void.33 Most notably, Lord
Mansfield's holding did not discuss the creditor's state of mind.34 Nor did
Lord Mansfield ground his decision in the equality of creditors. 35 Instead,
Lord Mansfield proposed a two element definition of preference: (1) an in-
tention of the debtor to prefer one creditor over others; and (2) an infliction
of wrong on the other creditors. 36
Acting on the preference problem in 1869, nearly 100 years later, Parlia-
ment codified the eve of bankruptcy definition, as three months before an act
of bankruptcy, and codified the preference definition, as related to the
debtor's intent.37 Because of reenactment in 188338 and 1914, 39 the English
view of preference remains substantially the same today: within a limited
window of time before bankruptcy, a voluntary transfer of property by the
debtor is voidable and subject to recapture regardless of the creditor's good
faith.40
27. See McCoid, supra note 16, at 251.
28. See Countryman, supra note 17, at 717.
29. 96 Eng. Rep. 384 (K.B. 1768).
30. See McCoid, supra note 16, at 252.
31. Id
32. 96 Eng. Rep. at 385.
33. MOORE & KING, supra note 17, $ 60.04 at 768.
34. McCoid, supra note 16, at 252. Mansfield later reached the same conclusion about a
transfer made by the debtor in anticipation of bankruptcy. See Rust v. Cooper, 98 Eng. Rep.
1277, 1280 (K.B. 1777). The creditor did not threaten suit or make any demand upon the
debtor, rather the transfer was made solely "to defeat the equality of the bankruptcy laws."
Id. 1279-80. When, however, a debtor made a payment on the eve of bankruptcy under a
mistaken belief that a creditor was about to bring suit, Lord Mansfield found no preference.
See Thomason v. Freeman, 99 Eng. Rep. 1026, 1028 (K.B. 1786).
35. See McCoid, supra note 16, at 253.
36. Countryman, supra note 17, at 718. In Alderson Lord Mansfield noted:
A general question has been started, whether a man may or may not at the eve
of bankruptcy, give a preference to a particular creditor? I think he may and he
may not. If [the creditor] demands it first, or sues [the debtor] or threatens him
without fraud, the preference is good. But where it is manifestly to defeat the
law, it is bad.
96 Eng. Rep. at 385.
37. 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71, § 92 (1869).
38. 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52, § 48 (1883).
39. 4 & 5 Geo., ch. 59, § 44 (1914).
40. 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52, § 48 (1883).
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B. United States History
As early United States bankruptcy law followed the English law of the
time,41 the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 neither defined nor prohibited prefer-
ences42 and United States courts allowed the recapture of transfers on the
basis of fraud.43 Evolving, United States law began to break away from the
English views on preference in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. 44 The 1841 Act
defined preferences similarly to the English definition, with an added inquiry
into the creditor's awareness of the debtor's financial status.4 5 Hence, the
1841 Act required an awareness of the debtor's insolvency by both the
debtor and the creditor before a court would void a transfer as preferential."
In Arnold v. Maynard47 Justice Story48 instituted the United States prac-
tice of de-emphasizing the debtor's motives. Disregarding the English dis-
tinction in this area, Story held that a debtor's state of solvency, not a threat
of pending litigation, determined whether a preference existed. 49 Justice
Story essentially concluded that the result itself - bankruptcy - established
the debtor's intent.5 0 The United States' statutory inquiry into the debtor's
intention thus became a question of the debtor's solvency at the time of
transfer.5 '
Emphasizing the creditors' awareness of the debtor's financial state, the
third American Bankruptcy Act of 186752 further crystallized the movement
away from investigating the debtor's motives. The 1867 Act analyzed voida-
41. Countryman, A History ofAmerican Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L. J. 226, 228 (1976).
42. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, (repealed 1803).
43. 2 Stat. at 21. See also, Locke v. Winning, 3 Mass. 325 (1807) (transfer by debtor the
day before act of bankruptcy held fraudulent by two of three judges).
44. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). This act, drafted by
Justice Story and Daniel Webster, was modeled after the Massachusetts Insolvency Law of
1838, ch. 163, § 10, 1838 Mass. Acts, amended by the Act of March 18, 1941 ch. 124 § 53,
1841 Mass. Acts and the Act of June 6, 1856, ch. 284, § 25, 1856 Mass. Acts. See C. WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 70 (1935).
45. 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843). This new bankruptcy act also introduced the con-
cepts of non-merchant bankruptcy and voluntary bankruptcy. The prior Act, 2 Stat. 19 (1800)
(repealed 1803), allowed only merchants or persons in the business of trading merchandise to
be declared bankrupt, and then only upon actions taken by creditors. 2 Stat. 19 §§ 1 and 2
(1800). The 1841 Act, in contrast, allowed any person to declare bankruptcy and to seek
protection from creditors by petition to the courts. 5 Stat. 440 § 1 (1841) (repealed 1843).
Merchants, however, still could be forced into bankruptcy by creditors. Id.
46. See, MOORE & KING supra note 17, 60.05 at 770.
47. 1 F. Cas. 1181 (CCD Mass. 1842) (No. 561).
48. Justice Story served as the principal drafter of the 1841 Act. See McCoid, supra note
16, at 253 n.31.
49. See Glenn, The Diversity of the Preferential Transfer: A Study in Bankruptcy History,
15 CORNELL L. Q. 521, 536 (1936).
50. See, e.g. Everett v. Stone, 8 F. Cas. 898 (C.C.D. Me. 1844) (No. 4577) (transfer was
preference where debtor knew it was insolvent); Morse v. Godfay, 17 F. Cas. 854 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1844) (No. 9856) (debtor who transferred virtually all of its property and immediately
sought bankruptcy intended preference); Peckham v. Burrows, 19 F. Cas. 85 (C.C.D. R.I.
1844) (No. 10,897) (intent to prefer presumed from debtor's transfer to secure creditor's help
to save debtor's business).
51. See Glenn, supra note 49, at 537.
52. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176 § 35, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
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ble preferences in a three-step process. 53 The Act focused upon (1) the
debtor's insolvency or his contemplation of insolvency in view of giving a
preference; 54 (2) the creditor's knowledge of the debtor's insolvency;55 and
(3) the transfer as a fraud upon the Act.56
Likewise, the Supreme Court interpreted the 1867 Act with a continued
the emphasis upon the debtor's balance sheet, while minimizing the Act's
language, "with a view to give a preference to any creditor."' 57 For example,
in Toofv. Martin 58 the Court held that the debtor knew of its insolvency and
was presumed to intend the consequences of its acts.59 In the absence of
proof by the debtor that it was both unaware of its insolvency, and had a
reasonable belief that it would be able to meet all debts, the Court concluded
that the debtor intended the preferences. 6° The Court further held that the
creditors had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent.61 In holding
the transfer a natural fraud on the Act,62 the Court condensed the statutory
elements to: (1) testing the debtor's intent by its balance sheet; and (2)
presuming fraud on the Act from the creditor's knowledge of the debtor's
poor financial health.63
The Supreme Court's opinion was so strong as to nullify the "intent to
prefer" 64 language in the subsequent Bankruptcy Act of 1898.65 In Carson,
53. Id. The creditor must possess "reasonable cause to believe [the debtor was] insol-
vent". Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. See MOORE & KING, supra note 17, 60.05 at 771.
56. 14 Stat. 517.
57. Id.
58. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 40 (1871).
59. Id. at 48.
60. The court held:
Making a transfer of property of these creditors, under these circumstance, was
in fact giving them a preference, and it must be presumed that the bankrupts
intended this result at the time. It is a general principle that everyone must be
presumed to intend the necessary consequences of his acts. The transfer, in any
case, by debtor, of a large portion of his property, while he is insolvent, to one
creditor, without making provision for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all
his creditors, necessarily operates as a preference to him, and must be taken as
conclusive evidence that a preference was intended, unless the debtor can show
that he was at the time ignorant of his insolvency, and that his affairs were such
that he could reasonably expect to pay all his debts. The burden of proof is upon
his in such case.
Id. at 48-49.
61. Id. at 49.
62. Id. at 51. In response to Toof Congress modified the Act to clearly require actual
knowledge by the creditor that the transfer was a fraud upon the Act, while maintaining that
the creditor merely needed reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. 18 Stat. 180
(1874). See McCoid, supra note 16, at 720 n.56.
63. See Glenn, supra note 49, at 538; McCoid, supra note 16, at 721.
64. Ch. 54, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
65. Ch. 54, § 60, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). See Glenn, supra note 49, at 538 (discuss-
ing trend in case law to disregard debtor's intent in spite of statutory language). See generally,
In re Hall, 4 Am. Bankr. Rep. 671, 683 (W.D.N.Y. 1900) (creditor's reasonable cause to be-
lieve debtor insolvent necessary to compel recovery of a preference).
The House Committee on the Judiciary recommended language that required the debtor's
"intent to (1) defeat the operation of this act; or (2) enable any one of his creditors to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than any of such creditors of the same class." See H.R. REP.
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Prairie & Scott v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. 66 the Court held that a prefer-
ence existed even when the debtor is innocent of any intent to prefer a credi-
tor.67 Finally, the 1910 amendments to the 1898 Act 68 codified the Court's
holding that a debtor's intent is immaterial. 69 The trustee, however, must
show that the creditor had "reasonable cause to believe that the transfer...
would affect a preference." 70
Another development in the United States bankruptcy statutory scheme
concerned the amount of time before a bankruptcy that a preference could
occur.71 While the 1841 and 1867 Acts limited the time frame,72 section 60a
of the 1898 Act originally did not set a limitation on the time before bank-
ruptcy that a transfer would be considered a preference. 73 Subsection b,
however, limited the time frame in which the trustee could avoid the trans-
fer.74 This inconsistency led to incongruous results when applied with other
sections of the Code.75 Amendments passed in 1903, therefore, set out a
four month statute of limitations in subsection a.76
In 1938, following numerous objections and complaints, Congress com-
pletely revised section 60.77 The United States' practice of disregarding the
No. 65, 55th Cong. 2d Sess. 21 (1897). The Conference Report, S. Doc. No. 294, 55th Cong.
2d Sess. 21 (1898) (eliminated the intent element from § 60(a)).
66. 182 U.S. 438 (1901).
67. 182 U.S. at 454-55.
68. 36 Stat. 838 (1910) (repealed 1978).
69. See MOORE & KING, supra note 16, 60.05 at 774.
70. Ch. 541, § 60b 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). This provision also referred to judgments
operating as preferences. The 1938 amendments later omitted judgments from the preference
section. See discussion infra, note 68. See also MOORE & KING, supra note 17, 60.06 at 782
(discussing changes made in section 60 by the Act of 1938).
71. See infra note 72-76 and accompanying text.
72. The 1841 Act limited the period of preference recovery to within two months of bank-
ruptcy, or to an earlier time if the creditor was aware of an act of bankruptcy or the debtor
intended to become bankrupt. 5 Stat. 440 § 2 (1841). The 1867 Act lengthened the time frame
to four months before bankruptcy. 14 Stat. 517 § 35 (1867). See Countryman, supra note 17,
at 719.
73. MOORE & KING, supra note 17, 1 60.05 at 772.
74. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, § 60b, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
75. See MOORE & KING, supra note 17, 60.06 at 777-78.
76. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, § 60b as amended by 32 Stat. 797 (1903) (repealed
1978).
77. MOORE & KING summarized the many objections to the pre-1938 version as follows:
(1) the definition of preference in § 60a was awkwardly stated; (2) while § 60
purported to deal with preference, it badly overlapped § 67f [now § 67a], in that
it expressly covered both transfers and "judgments" entered against the bank-
rupt; (3) the reference to judgments, in so far as it related to preferential trans-
fers was inept, as it did not contemplate that before a judgement could amount
to a preferential transfer it must be carried to the point where a lien was created;
(4) the language of § 60 was cumbersome, and the definition of a preference in
§ 60a was unnecessarily repeated though with certain confusing variances, in
§ 60b; (5) the test with respect to the running of the four months' period, stated
in § 60a was unsatisfactory, not comprehensive and open to conflicting interpre-
tations-moreover, it did not conform to a similar test prescribed in § 3b, nor to
the language of § 60b; (6) the determination of voidability under § 60b depended
on whether the preferred creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the trans-
fer or enforcement of the judgement "would effect a preference", which require-
ment was "indirect, confusing, and unsatisfactory";(7) the provision in § 60b
giving the trustee the option to recover the property or its value was "not sound
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debtor's intent, while requiring an inquiry into the creditor's state of mind,
remained in the Act 78 until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 79
III. PREFERENCE POLICY
An understanding of the history and development of preference law leads
to an inquiry into the modem purposes and policies behind preference law. 80
Basically, a preference constitutes the transfer of property, favoring one ex-
isting creditor over another.8 ' Unlike a fraudulent conveyance, the courts
will not interfere with preference occurring outside of bankruptcy.8 2 Bank-
ruptcy law, on the other hand, interferes with a preference upon insolvency
because a payment favoring one creditor over another results in harm to the
other, by limiting the assets available for distribution.8 3 In a bankruptcy
setting, the law interdicts a collective proceeding upon all creditors of the
same class.84 In the context of a collective proceeding, preference law looks
to the "relationship among creditors and not the relationship between the
debtor and the creditor."8 5
Equality in the treatment of creditors is an old and repeatedly advanced
or equitable"; (8) there was no provision protecting bona fide transferees of the
preferred creditor, nor was there any provision expressly permitting the trustee
to protect the estate through a right of subrogation to the lien or security given
by way of preference, although this was done by virtue of other provisions of the
Act; and (9) there were no provisions in the Act dealing with stock brokerage
transactions, and the rules developed by the Supreme Court under the so-called
"New York" rule were deemed difficult to apply and inequitable.
MOORE & KING, supra note 17, 60.06 at 777-78 (footnotes omitted).
See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60, as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 840 (1938).
78. See MOORE & KING, supra note 17, 60.06 at 779 n.13 (graphically setting forth
precise changes effected by 1938 amendments). Countryman, supra note 16, at 724.
79. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1988).
80. See infra notes 81-121 and accompanying text.
81. Jackson, supra note 5, at 757.
82. McCoid, supra note 16, at 260. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 3(a)
(1918). Although the trustee in bankruptcy may avoid both fraudulent conveyances and pref-
erences, fraudulent conveyances are also voidable under state law by action of individual credi-
tors. See Clark, supra note 19, at 515.
Additionally, classification of transfers as fraudulent conveyances or preferences creates dif-
ferent results for secured creditors under the Code. Property recovered as a preference is not
subject to a creditors' prepetition security interest. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. (In re An-
tinarelli Enters., Inc.), 94 Bankr. 227, 230-31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); Mellon Bank (East)
N.A. (In re Integrated Testing Prods. Corp.), 69 Bankr. 901, 905 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987) (recov-
ery of preference for benefit of the estate) But see, Mitchell v. Rock Hill Nat'l Bank (In re
Mid-Atlantic Piping), 24 Bankr. 314, 321-25 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982) (security interest ex-
tends to recovery of preference). In contrast, property recovered by the trustee as a fraudulent
transfer remains subject to creditors' prepetition security interest. In re Figerao, 79 Bankr.
914, 918 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987) (creditor's right to property exists outside Code); In re Cam-
bria Clover Mercantile Co., 51 Bankr. 983, 985-86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); see also Claussen
Concrete Co. v. Walker (In re Lively), 74 Bankr. 238, 239 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1987) (fraudulent
conveyances subject to secured claims of judgment lienholder), aff'd 851 F.2d 363 (1 1th Cir.
1988).
83. McCoid, supra note 16, at 260.
84. Id. See also G.GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES, (2d ed.
1940) § 1 (bankruptcy is collective proceeding).
85. Jackson, supra note 5, at 757.
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goal of preference law.86 Correspondingly, preference law is the basic
method by which the law prevents some creditors from engaging in a "race
of diligence" leaving other creditors with the "tag ends and remnants."'87
Preference law also prevents a creditor from choosing to remove itself from
the collective proceeding of bankruptcy when the debtor's demise is immi-
nent.88 Overall, preference law seeks to prevent creditor misbehavior not
debtor misbehavior. 89 Significantly, the social policy underlying bankruptcy
laws requires balancing the operation of the preference laws against the gen-
eral availability of credit to the closed corporation.9
A. The 1978 Act and 1984 Amendments
1. Section 547
The Federal Commission responsible for drafting the first version of the
new preference section of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act91 had three
goals: (1) to reduce the rush by creditors to disassemble the debtor; (2) to
advance equity among the creditor classes; and (3) to prevent the making of
loans as a pretext to obtaining a preferred or secured interest in the debtor's
property.92 In a major change, the 1978 Act eliminated the requirement
that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent during
the ninety day period before bankruptcy. 93
Specifically, section 547 allows the trustee to avoid any transfers of prop-
erty interest, subject to several exceptions, when the debtor makes a trans-
fer:94 (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;95 (2) for or because of an
antecedent debt owed by the debtor;96 (3) while insolvent;97 (4) on or within
the ninety days before the debtor's filing for bankruptcy;98 or (5) that enables
the creditor to obtain more that it would have under chapter 7 of the Code,
had the debtor not transferred the property and had the court handled the
creditor's claims under the provisions of chapter 11.99
The Code reduced the time for the trustee to recover any preference, from
four months under the 1898 Act, to ninety days.1°° In exchange, the Act
86. McCoid, supra note 16, at 260. See, Countryman, supra note 19, at 748 (equality
among types of creditors is true goal of bankruptcy). But see, Clark, supra note 19, at 516 (the
goal of equality is undermined by the numerous exceptions via subordination among
creditors).
87. MOORE & KING, supra note 17, 60.01 at 743.
88. Jackson, supra note 5, at 759.
89. T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY, at 126 n. 8 (1986).
90. See Meckling, Financial Markets, Default and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 13, 23-24 (1977).
91. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1978) (amended 1988).
92. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H. Doc. No.
137, pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1973).
93. See Countryman, supra note 17, at 726.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b) (1988).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1988).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b)(2) (1988).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b)(3) (1988).
98. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988).
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eliminated the trustee's burden of proof on the issue of the creditor's reason-
able cause to believe the debtor insolvent. 101 This change resulted in a pre-
sumption of the debtor's insolvency ninety days before bankruptcy. 10 2
Consequently, the burden of showing the debtor's solvency shifted to the
creditor. 103
In contrast, the 1978 Act subjected a transfer to an insider of the debtor to
an extended period of preference recovery from ninety days, to one year
before filing. 104 The trustee, however, retains the burden of proof that the
inside creditor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. 105 This
additional burden on the trustee serves preference law's historical purpose,
preventing creditor misbehavior. °0 The insider is subject to a longer period
of scrutiny because of a presumption that the insider possesses greater
knowledge of the debtor's financial health. 10 7 If the insider is unaware of
the debtor's insolvency or pending insolvency, then the debtor's insider has
not misbehaved and a preference over the collective process has not
occurred.108
A 1984 amendment to the Act' °9 eliminated the trustee's burden of show-
ing the insider's knowledge of the debtor's poor financial health. At least
one commentator termed the elimination a "prize example" of congressional
ineptitude. 110 Congress, however, did not remove the requirement as an act
of deliberate policy choice, but rather through a legislative accident."I' To-
101. Countryman, supra note 17, at 726. Elimination of the reasonable cause requirement
also allows the trustee to avoid as preferences under section 547, judicial liens obtained within
the preference period, previously voidable under section 67a of the Act. See Teofan and Creel,
The Trustee's Avoiding Powers Under the Bankruptcy Act and The New Code: A Comparative
Analysis, 85 COMM. L. J. 542, 552 (1985).
102. Countryman, supra note 17, at 726.
103. Id. at 727.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1988).
106. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
107. See Pitts, supra note 11, at 353.
108. See T. JACKSON, supra note 89.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
110. Countryman, supra note 17, at 732.
111. Id. In 1981 the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a number of hearings on
amendments to the 1978 Act. Creditors suggested an exception to preference law for certain
payments on consumer debt. The committee produced a bill reattaching a "reasonable cause
to believe the debtor insolvent" requirement on all voidable preferences. The Senate approved
the amendment when attached to another bill dealing with the jurisdictional problems of bank-
ruptcy courts, but the House failed to pass the provision. S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
In 1984, however, the House did pass a bill which exempted individual consumer debtor
transfers of less than $600 from the preference section. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess.
When this bill reached the Senate, several amendments were attached, including the require-
ment of the reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent on all preferences. 130 CONG.
REC. S. 6082, S. 6122 (daily ed. May 21, 1984). A prolonged debate ensued, and in order to
speed up the debate process several of the amendments were withdrawn, including the amend-
ment requiring a reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. 130 CONG. REC. S. 7617
(daily ed. June 19, 1984). At this point the legislative accident occurred. By attaching the
requirement to all preferences, the amendment naturally deleted the requirement from
§ 547(b)(4)(B) and created a new paragraph (6). When the new paragraph (6) was removed,
the requirement was not reinserted into § 547(b)(4)(B). See Countryman, supra note 17 at 732-
33 n. 115 (detailed discussion of legislative process resulting in deletion of requirement that
creditor have knowledge of debtor's insolvency).
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day, the policy behind the insider rule stands unchanged: to prevent insider
creditor misbehavior, occurring by virtue of special knowledge of the
debtor's financial status." 2 Congress, however, did not eliminate the burden
on the trustee of establishing the creditor as a insider." 3
2. Section 550
Section 5 50(a) is also derived from section 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act.' 14
A similar problem existed under the Act regarding recovery from an initial
transferee who was not the cause of an avoidance.' 1 5 Under the Act, the
basis for avoiding the transfer resulted from the status of the creditor receiv-
ing or benefiting from the preferential transfer." 6 The trustee, however,
could recover from any person who received the transferred property." 7
Before the 1938 amendments, trustees could recover only from creditors
receiving or benefiting from a preferential transfer, and possessing reason-
able cause to believe the transfer to be a preference. 18 Again, congressional
sloppiness rather than clear policy choices led to the elimination of the rea-
sonable cause requirement. 1 9 At least one commentator concluded that
Congress did not make a deliberate policy choice to seek recovery from cred-
itors receiving payments on a loan but who lacking "the reasonable cause to
believe" that the transfer was avoidable under the amended Act.' 20 Absent
clear intent, Congress most likely carried such an interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Act over to the Code.12'
IV. PREFERENCE CASE LAW
The judicial application of preference law to the inside guarantor/outside
creditor has resulted in a split among the bankruptcy courts. 22 While two
lines of reasoning reach the result that no extended preference period exists
for the outside creditors,' 23 a growing number of courts reason that an ex-
tended preference does exist against an outside lender.' 24
112. See T. JACKSON, supra note 89. Cf United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 379 (1988) (absent clear congressional indication to the contrary,
Congress presumed to have incorporated judicial interpretation of Bankruptcy Act into Code).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B)(i).
114. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws ofthe United States, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. pt. 2 at 180 (1973). Additionally, section 550 derived from
sections 67a(3) and 70d(5) of the Act.
115. See Pitts, supra note 11, at 354-55.
116. Act of June 22, 1938, PUB. L. No. 75-696, § 60b, 52 Stat. 840, 870 (repealed 1978).
117. Id.
118. Acts of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 11, 36 Stat. 838, 842 (amended 1938).
119. Pitts, supra note 11, at 350-51.
120. See J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY, § 270, at 312-13
(1956).
121. See Note, The Interplay Between section 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 530, 542 (1989).
122. See infra notes 125-231 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 125-27, 208-31 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 144-207 and accompanying text.
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A. The Equitable Theory
In Seeley v. Church Building & Interiors, Inc. 125 the court examined the
common fact pattern under which the controversy arises. A closed corpora-
tion sought a business loan from a bank, and the bank sought and received
the individual guarantees of the corporation's secretary and vice-president.
Ninety-one days before filing bankruptcy, the bank released the inside guar-
antors from the note in exchange for a security interest in all of the corpora-
tion's assets.126 The court assumed that a preference existed 127 and turned
its analysis to section 550, to check the conditions by which the trustee could
recover an avoided transfer.1 28
Analyzing the "initial transferee" language of section 550, the court held
that a literal reading of the statute resulted in an inequitable result.129 The
court relied primarily upon the discussion of the issue in Collier. 130 The
court noted that a literal reading placed the prudent outside lender with an
insider guarantee in a worse position than the lender who did not secure the
loan with a guarantee. 131 Thus, the court exercised equitable powers and
held that no preference existed against the outside lender. 132
A more recent use of this theory involved a completely different fact pat-
tern and arose in a Texas bankruptcy court in TB. Westex Foods, Inc. v.
Alaska Continental Bank (In re TB. Westex Foods, Inc.). 133 Alaska Con-
tinential Bank ("ACB") obtained a money judgement against an insider of
Westex Foods ("Westex"). To enforce the judgement, ACB served the cor-
125. 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. W.D. 1981).
126. The trustee argued that the transfer occurred within the ninety day preference period.
Id at 130.
127. The court made this assumption without reaching a decision on the issue because the
guarantor was not a party to the suit. Id. at 130.
128. Id. at 131. 11 U.S.C. § 550 provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is
avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if
the court so orders, the value of such property, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
(c) Yhe trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction under subsection (a) of
this section ....
129. Seeley, 14 Bankr. at 131.
130. LAWRENCE, 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 550 (15th ed. 1987).
"In some circumstances, a literal application of section 550(a) would permit the
trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing and deserves
protection. In such circumstances the bankruptcy court should use its equitable
powers to prevent an inequitable result.... [For example, I]f a transfer is made
to a creditor who is not an insider more than 90 days but within one year before
bankruptcy and the effect is to prefer an insider-guarantor, recovery should be
restricted to the guarantor and the creditor should be protected. Otherwise, a
creditor who does not demand a guarantor can be better off that one who does.
Id. at 550.02 (footnotes omitted).
131. Seeley, 14 Bankr. at 131.
132. Id.
133. 96 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
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poration with a writ of garnishment of the insiders' wages. As a result, the
corporation defaulted and ACB secured a garnishment judgement against
the corporation.
Seeking to enforce the garnishment judgement, ACB filed additional gar-
nishment actions against two banks that held accounts for the corporation.
The bank impleaded the funds in the accounts, forming the basis of the ad-
versarial proceeding before the bankruptcy court. The corporation filed for
bankruptcy 119 days after the filing of the impleader action. The debtor-in-
possession sought to avoid the transfers caused by the garnishment, as a
preference to an insider within one year of bankruptcy.
The court distinguished Westex from the typical case on two grounds. 134
First, in the guarantor situation, the insider holds a contingent claim of ac-
tion against the corporation and hence, is a creditor.13 5 The Westex court
held the insider had no claim against the corporation because Westex's lia-
bility arose out of its own failure to respond to the writs of garnishment. 136
Alternatively, assuming the insider did have a contingent claim against the
debtor, the court held the result under section 550(a) inequitable.13 7 The
court, therefore, denied recovery to the debtor-in-possession. 138
B. The Literalist Theory
A second and contrasting viewpoint to the equitable theory consists of the
literalist approach.139 In short, the courts subscribing to the literalist line of
reasoning conclude either: (1) the unambiguous language of the statute re-
134. Id. at 80-81.
135. See infra notes 154-95 and accompanying text discussing Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin.
Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co.) 874 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir. 1989). See also 11
U.S.C. § 101(9) defining creditor as an: (A) entity that has a claim against the debtor that
arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor; (B) entity that has a
claim against the estate of a kind specified in section 348(d), 502(f), 502(g), 502(h) or 502(i) of
this title; ... Id.
136. Westex, 96 Bankr. at 80. The insider had no claim unless the insider could show that
he had in fact paid the debt. Id.
137. 96 Bankr. at 81.
138. Id. at 81. Other courts have found application of section 550(a) inequitable in the
insider-guarantor situation. See, e.g., Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n (In re Mid-
western Co.), 96 Bankr. 224, 225 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (finding preference action a creature
of equity and that bankruptcy courts applying doctrine should apply equitable provisions)
aff'd 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.),
70 Bankr. 928, 934 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (following majority rule rejecting literal interpre-
tation); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77, 81-82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (restricting
recovery of trustee to insider only on equitable grounds).
Several other courts have held the operation of section 550(a) inequitable in other circum-
stances, most notably the commercial conduit exception. See, e.g., Hufman v. Commerce Sec.
Corp. (In re Harbour), 845 F.2d 1254, 1257 (4th Cir. 1988) (literal application too narrow
when defendant is commercial enterprise handling transactions in routine fashion); Metsch v.
First Ala. Bank (In re Columbian Coffee Co.), 59 Bankr. 643, 645-46 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986)
(bank was commercial conduit and recovery by trustee against bank would result in windfall
from innocent bystander); Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 334,
336-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (inequitable result occurs if transfer to mere conduit of funds
recovered by trustee).
139. See infra notes 144-207 and accompanying notes.
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stricts the bankruptcy court's exercise of its equitable powers; 140 (2) the re-
sult under section 550(a) is fair to the outside creditors; 14 1 or (3) a
combination of both conclusions. 142 Under the literalist viewpoint, the
trustee may recover from the outside creditor, holding a guarantee of a
debtor's insider, for the extended one year preference period. 1 43
The court in Mixon v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc. (In re Big Three Trans-
portation)144 wrote one of the first opinions applying the literalist approach.
Big Three Transportation, Inc. ("Big Three") was a closely held corporation
owned by five shareholders. One shareholder held thirty percent of the stock
and also functioned as an officer and a member of the board of directors of
the corporation. To obtain a line of credit from Mid-Continent System, Inc.
("Mid-Continent"), the shareholder, along with two others, guaranteed the
corporation's indebtedness to Mid-Continent. The trustee established both
requirements of section 547(b)(4)(B), as the statute existed before the 1984
amendments: (1) that the shareholder was an insider, and (2) that the share-
holder knew of the corporation's insolvency at the time of the corporation's
three transfers to Mid-Continent. 145
The Big Three court held that the first transfer was not a preference be-
cause the corporation made the payment within forty-five days of its receipt
of a statement reflecting a balance due. 14 6 . The court based this conclusion
on the 1978 Code section 547(c)(2)(B) which denied the trustee the power to
avoid transfers made within forty-five days of the debt coming due. 147 The
court also held a portion of the second transfer non-preferential for the same
reason.' 48 The court concluded that the balance of the second payment, and
the entire third payment, were not within the exceptions provided for in
section 547(c).' 49 The court, therefore, held these payments avoidable by
the trustee.'5 0
Having held the payments avoidable, the Big Three court next examined
the critical issue of whether an action for preferential transfer existed against
Mid-Continent as the initial transferee under 11 U.S.C. section 550(a)(1).' 15
The court implied that the outside lender could not equitably be held liable
in this situtation.152 The court, however, grounded its ruling on the unam-
biguous language of section 550(a) and concluded that transfers not ex-
cluded by section 547(c) were recoverable from Mid-Continent as the initial
140. See infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
142. See infra 144-207 and accompanying text.
143. See infra 144-207 and accompanying text.
144. 41 Bankr. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983).
145. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
146. Big Three, 41 Bankr. at 18.
147. Id.




152. Id. The court appreciated "[the equitable analysis] of what is apparently perceived to




1. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio
Construction Co.)
Although labeled the minority view, the Seventh Circuit's adoption of the
literal approach in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In re V.N.
Deprizio Construction Co.) 154 provided the first use of the plain meaning the-
ory by an appellate court.155 The corporation borrowed money from several
sources guaranteed by the corporation's president and family members. All
of the guarantors were insiders under section 101(30) of the Code. 156 Ad-
ding confusion to the case, the insiders were also liable for taxes owed by the
corporation to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").157 Additionally, the
corporation's insiders were obligated to make the corporation's payments to
the pension and welfare plans ("the Funds") for the employees. The trustee
argued that the debtor made payments to the outside creditors, the IRS, and
the Funds between ninety days and one year before the filing of bankruptcy.
These payments benefitted the corporate insiders, and therefore, were recov-
erable under section 547(b)(4)(B).
The bankruptcy court applied the two transfer theory, and, without decid-
ing whether any payments were preferential, denied the trustee recovery. 158
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's holding and held that the
preference rules of the Bankruptcy Code apply to all payments made be-
tween ninety days and one year before a bankruptcy petition, if made to
creditors with a legal right to recover from the debtor's insiders.' 59 The
district court, thus, allowed the trustee to recover from all of the non-insider
recipients of the payments, including the IRS and the Funds. 16°
The Seventh Circuit, on appeal, relieved the IRS and the Funds from the
trustee's recovery powers under reasoning similar to the Westex court's rea-
soning. 161 The IRS, the court stated, did not receive a guarantee from the
153. Id. at 21.
154. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
155. See Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 199 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir.
1990); Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 97 Bankr. 77 (W.D.
Okla. 1988), aff'd sub. nom., Manufactures Handover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey, 892 F.2d 850
(10th Cir. 1989).
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (30)(B)(1988).
157. Preferences can be recovered from the IRS as a result of the combined effect of 11
U.S.C. §§ 106(c), 547(b)(5) and 507(a)(6). "As provided, section 106(c) of the House amend-
ment overrules contrary language in the House report with the result that the Government is
subject to avoidance of preferential transfers." 124 CONG. REC. H1i1,089 (daily ed. Sept 28,
1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
158. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp (In re V. N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 Bankr. 478,
480 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1986). See discussion on the two transfer theory, infra notes 208-33 and
accompanying text.
159. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp (In re V. N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 86 Bankr. 545,
553 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
160. Id. at 553.
161. 96 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying
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insiders.162 Instead, by operation of the law, 163 the court said that the IRS
could hold the corporate insider liable for the corporation's failure to pay the
required income taxes. 16'4 The court held this liability a penalty extracted
from the insider. ' 65 As such, if the IRS sought and recovered taxes from an
insider, the insider would not have a claim against the corporation.166 Lack-
ing any claim against the corporation, the insider is not a creditor of the
corporation under section 547.167 The court concluded that since the insider
was not a creditor with respect to the corporation's payments to the IRS, no
preference occurred. 168 The court reached a similar conclusion concerning
the insider's obligations to the Funds, holding that the trustee could not
recover from the Funds .169
Turning to the issue of the trustee's recovery from the outside creditor
under section 550(a)(1), the court held the transfer avoidable, reasoning that
an insider, as a creditor, benefitted from the transfer to the lender. 170 The
court began with an examination of the purpose behind preference law, con-
cluding that the law intended to cause creditors to refrain from asset grab-
bing to the prejudice of other creditors. 17 1 Noting that corporate insiders
are usually aware first of a corporation's financial problems, the court specu-
lated that insiders could pay their own loans to the corporation before the
statutory ninety day preference period. 172 To solve this perceived problem,
the court noted two potential solutions.' 73 One imposed a costly monitoring
duty upon the corporation's outside creditors to catch the inside transfers
before the statutory preference period expired.' 74 The statute at issue uti-
lized the other solution: an extended preference period for insiders to pre-
vent "even the prescient managers who first see the end coming... to prefer
themselves in distribution."' 175
Next, the court squarely faced the issue of when an insider is a guarantor
162. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186,
1191 (7th Cir. 1989).
163. 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (a) (1988) provides in part:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account
for and pay over such tax .... shall, . . . be liable to a penalty equal to the total
amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over
Id.




168. Id. at 1192. The court also dismissed the trustee's argument that the insider had a
common law right of indemnity against the corporation. The court found that the insider
must fail recklessly to collect or pay the taxes, and that the common law will not indemnify a
reckless tort-feasor. But see Borowitz, supra note 6, at 2153-56 (critizing courts denial of re-
covery from IRS).
169. Id at 1194.
170. Id.
171. Id. (quoting Jackson, supra note 5, at 727-31, 756-68).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1194-95.
174. Id. at 1194.
175. Id. at 1195.
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on a corporate loan from an outside lender. The court noted that an insider
could induce a financially troubled corporation to pay first those notes upon
which the insider was liable. 176 The court concluded that when the debtor
makes a payment more than ninety days before filing, insiders "make out
like bandits."' 177 Acknowledging that the trustee could recover the value of
the released guarantee from the insider, the court presumed, however, that
the value of the released guarantee would be difficult to determine. 7  Addi-
tionally, the court hypothesized that the insider would prefer to challenge
the power of the trustee, rather than fight outside creditors. 179
The court united the provisions of sections 547 and 550,180 holding that
the unambiguous language of section of 550(a)(1) allows recovery from the
initial transferee or from the entity that benefits from the transfer.' 8 1 In
responding to the equity argument, the court first established a limitation
upon the use of equitable powers by the bankruptcy court. 8 2 Citing Mobil
Oil Corp v. Higginbotham,18 3 the Deprizio court explained, "[t]here is a basic
difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting rules
that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted."' 18 4 Having previ-
ously attacked the equitable argument relieving the outside lender of prefer-
ence liability in Bonded Financial Services, Inc. v. European American
Bank, 85 the court insisted that the Supreme Court in Norwest Bank Worth-
ington v. Ahlers,186 supported its interpretation.18 7 In Ahlers the Supreme
Court held that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts




178. Id. The court failed to consider that the value of the release of the guarantee logically
equals the value of the transfer to the outside lender.
179. Id. This statement is questionable since the insider logically must work with the
trustee to reorganize the corporate debtor. Only if the insider has abandoned the corporation
would the insider be indifferent or contemptuous of the trustee's actions.
180. 874 F.2d at 1190.
181. The court apparently contradicts this statement later by recognizing that the "Code
separates the identification of avoidable transfers (§ 547) from the identification of those who
must pay (§ 550)." 874 F.2d at 1196.
182. Id
183. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
184. Id. at 625.
185. 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988) (dicta).
186. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
187. 874 F.2d at 1198.
188. 485 U.S. at 206. But see Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (overrid-
ing consideration that equitable principles govern exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction); Lend
Lease, A Div. of Nat'l Car Rental Sys. v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp.) 780 F.2d
1339, 1343 (8th Cir. 1985) (bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, do not read statutory lan-
guage with preciseness of a computer but operate under "overriding consideration that equita-
ble principals govern exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction.") (citing National Bank & Trust Co.
v. Williams (In re Williams), 7 Bankr. 234, 236 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980), quoting Morin);
Edson v. Wisconsin Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Edson), 86 Bankr. 141, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
1988) (interpreting Ahlers decision as speaking only to powers bankruptcy court has as a court
of equity and not limiting powers of bankruptcy court to give equitable interpretation to
statutes).
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The Deprizio court explained further that the result was not inequitable
because the creditors bargained for the right to recover from the insider in
case of the corporation's insolvency.18 9 The court noted that if outside cred-
itors had concerns about the extended preference period, those creditors
should monitor the debtor more closely. 190 The court gave little reflection to
earlier references of the high cost of such monitoring or the difficulties the
outside creditor faced in performing such a task. 191 Instead, the court
merely opined that such creditors could charge a higher interest rate.192
Finally, the court concluded that the trustee could avoid the transfer only
if a preference existed. 193 The statute, the court added, still protected the
outside creditor through provisions requiring that the trustee establish that
the amount received by the outside creditor exceeded that which the creditor
would have received under a chapter bankruptcy. 194 Additionally, the
outside creditor could avail itself of the exceptions contained in section
547(c).195
The Tenth Circuit recently affirmed an Oklahoma district court decision
which followed the same theory, allowing recovery by the trustee. 196 In
Lowrey v. First National Bank (In re Robinson Brothers Drilling, Inc.) 197 a
corporate officer of a closed corporation personally guaranteed payment of
the corporate debts to outside creditors. Within a period between ninety
days and one year before the corporation filed for bankruptcy, the corpora-
tion made payments on the debts to the outside creditors. Instead of arguing
the inequity of the preference, the outside lender argued that the court
should view the transfer as two transfers: one to the insider and one to the
outsider. Only the transfer to the insider, therefore, should be avoidable and
recoverable. 1 98
The Robinson court reasoned that the policy behind the two-transfer the-
ory stemmed from an attempt to avoid the inequitable result of strict con-
struction.' 99 Thus, the court combined its response to the outside lender's
argument with the equitable theory which restricted recovery by the
trustee. 20° Persuaded by the argument of the Seventh Circuit in Bonded Fi-
189. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186,
1198 (7th Cir. 1989).
190. Id.
191. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
192. 874 F.2d at 1198.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1199.
195. Id
196. Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 97 Bankr. 77 (W.D.
Okla. 1988), aff'd sub. nom., Manufactures Handover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey, 892 F.2d 850
(10th Cir. 1989).
197. 97 Bankr. 77 (W.D. Okla. 1988), aff'd sub. nom., Manufactures Handover Leasing
Corp. v. Lowrey, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).
198. See Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corrugated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Indust., Inc.), 37
Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984). See infra notes 208-33 and accompanying text.




nancial Services, Inc. v. European American Bank,20° the Robinson court
noted that the imposition of liability may be equitable because the lender can
recover the debt from the guarantor.20 2 The Robinson court recognized,
however, that loans from non-inside lenders secured by non-inside guaran-
tors would not be recoverable. 20 3 Additionally, the court stated that the
non-inside creditor, regardless of the identity of the guarantor, could use the
defense and exceptions granted under section 547(c). 204
The court limited "[t]he equitable powers of a bankruptcy court... to
avoid strict construction." 20 5 Relying on the plain language of the statute,
the court held that Congress intended to implement a bright line rule that
the trustee could recover preferential payments regardless of the absence of
bad faith on the part of the creditor.206 Because the corporate creditor held
a guarantee from a corporate insider, the court concluded that the creditor
exposed itself to the extended one year preference period. 207
C. The Two Transfer Theory
In Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corrugated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Indus-
tries, Inc.)208 the court employed a second theory to deny recovery to the
trustee. In applying a direct/indirect transfer analysis to the problem,2° 9
the court noted that the statutory scheme separated the avoidance provisions
from the recovery provisions.210 The court made a direct analysis of section
547(b)(4)(B) before turning to section 550(a).211
In Mercon two insiders guaranteed the corporation's debt at an undis-
closed time before the filing of bankruptcy by the debtor corporation.
Within the year before filing, the corporation paid the outside creditor
slightly more than $100,000 on the debt. The outside creditor sought dis-
missal of the trustee's preference action because the trustee failed to state a
cause of action against the outside creditor.
Beginning the analysis with section 547, the bankruptcy court held that
the single transfer of funds by the debtor constituted two independent trans-
fers,212 a direct transfer to the primary outside creditor, and an indirect
transfer to the inside creditors.21 3 The court acknowledged that the trans-
fers benefitted the inside guarantors within the meaning of section
201. 838 F.2d 890, 894-95 (7th Cir. 1988) (expressing doubts about use of equity to deny
recovery under section 550(a)).
202. Robinson, 97 Bankr. at 82.
203. Id.
204. Ia
205. Id. (citing Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988)).
206. Id. at 82-83.
207. Id. at 83.
208. 37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).








Noting the independence of the insider, the court concluded that the in-
sider's liability was not predicated upon the transfer to the outside credi-
tor.213 The court, moreover, held that the trustee failed to satisfy the burden
of proof under section 547(b).2 16 The court failed to state with sufficient
clarity whether the burden the trustee failed to meet consisted of proof that
the transfer was to an insider, or proof that the insider possessed reasonable
cause to believe the debtor insolvent.21 7
Courts, and at least one commentator, question the application of the di-
rect/indirect analysis to the case law controversy. 218 The Fifth Circuit in
Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (Matter of Compton),2 19 however, favora-
bly cited Mercon for the application of the direct/indirect transfer theory.
220
A closer look at the Fifth Circuit's analysis, however, reveals an overexten-
sion of the theory by the Mercon court.221
In Compton the trustee sought recovery of a transfer made by a letter of
credit ninety days before the filing of bankruptcy. Compton Corporation
("Compton") received a shipment of oil from the Blue Quail Energy Com-
pany ("Blue Quail"), for which Compton failed to make timely payment.
Compton arranged a letter of credit benefitting Blue Quail by offering the
lender the assets of the corporation as security. Compton exchanged the
letter of credit with Blue Quail for an extension of time to make the pay-
ment. The day after the issuance of the letter of credit, several of the corpo-
ration's creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Compton.
Blue Quail collected on the letter of credit, and the Bank claimed a security
interest in the debtor's property.
Since the bank gave new value to Compton by providing the letter of
credit in exchange for the increased security interest, the direct transfer of
property to the bank qualified as an exception to section 547.222 Conse-
quently, the trustee, and not the lender, argued the two transfer theory to the
court. In addition, the trustee sought recovery of the preference from the
214. Id. at 551.
215. Id. at 552-53.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 874
F.2d 1186, 1195-96 (7th Cir. 1989) (single payment is one transfer); Lowrey v. First Nat'l
Bank (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 97 Bankr. 77, 82 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (rejecting two
transfer theory in favor of strict construction); Nutovic, supra note 8, at 193 (analysis incor-
rect because it ignores the fact that Congress specifically provided for liability of initial
transferee).
219. 831 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987).
220. Id. at 590.
221. Id. at 593-94. For a discussion comparing the Deprizio and Blue Quail opinions, see
Brister & Wallander, Indirect Preferential Transfers - Diverging Judicial Interpretations, 8th
ANNUAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, Univ. of Texas School of Law (1989).
222. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1982 & Supp. IV. 1986) provides: "The trustee may not avoid
under this section a transfer- (1) to the extent that such transfer was (A) intended by the
debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporane-
ous exchange for new value given to the debtor; ... Id.
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creditor that received indirect benefit of the preferential transfer.223
The Blue Quail court enumerated several considerations in the formula-
tion of its finding.224 First, the court noted that the bank issuing the letter of
credit bargained for the risk of the debtor's insolvency but did not bargain
for the risk of preference attack by the trustee.225 Next, the court found that
Compton arranged the letter of credit after the debt originally became due
and payable.226 Although the court did not directly discuss the creditor's
state of mind in the opinion, the court implied that Blue Quail's motivation
in obtaining the letter stemmed from its own doubts concerning Compton's
financial health. 227 Third, the court took notice of the broad statutory defi-
nition of transfer, encompassing both direct and indirect transfers. 228 Ap-
plying these considerations to the facts, the court held that the trustee could
recover from a creditor that receives an indirect preference, even though the
direct transferee is not subject to preference attack.229
The Mercon court disregarded the historical context of the direct/indirect
test to impose liability upon the indirect transferee.230 Instead, the court
concluded that the direct transferee could avoid a preference attack by the
trustee if an independent indirect transferee was liable. 23' The court failed
to distinguish, however, between a person seeking to maintain an action of
liability against an indirect beneficiary, and a direct beneficiary using the
same theory to avoid liability because of the existence of an indirect benefici-
ary.232 The correct application of the rule to the inside guarantor/outside
lender controversy is: if one can show that the direct transferee or outside
lender is not subject to preference, then the two transfer theory is appropri-
ate to show the indirect transferee's or insider's liability.233
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Mercon court inappropriately applied the two transfer the-
ory, the court came close to identifying the true problem. This Comment
depicts the error of the literal approach, which merely labels the outside
lender an initial transferee and blindly applies section 550(a)(1). Instead of
focusing on two transfers, the correct analysis focuses upon two creditors:
the insider to whom section 547(b)(4)(B) applies, and the outside lender to
223. 831 F.2d at 590.
224. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
225. 831 F.2d at 590.
226. Id.
227. Id. The court noted the letter "served as a back up payment guarantee on an extension
of credit already in jeopardy." Id.
228. Id. at 592, n.6; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (defining transfer as "every mode, direct or
indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with
property or with an interest in property...
229. 831 F.2d at 595.
230. Id.
231. Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corrugated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Indust., Inc.), 37
Bankr. 549, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).




whom section 547(b)(4)(A) applies.234 The literal application of sections 547
and 550 fails by considering section 550(a)(1) in isolation. The equitable
approach presents the same problem. First, the literalist approach defeats
the very purpose behind preference law. Second, basic rules of statutory
construction support the majority result of relieving the outside lender of the
exposure to the extended inside preference period, simply because an insider
guaranteed the credit arrangement of the closed corporation.
A. The Purpose of Preference Law
As previously discussed, the two purposes underlying preference law are
the equality of distribution among creditors and the prevention of creditor
misbehavior. 235 Preference law functions by deterring the race to dismem-
ber the debtor, which in turn, promotes equality of distribution. 236 The facts
surrounding the case law controversy consist of an outside creditor simply
receiving payment on a debt, within ninety days to one year before the cor-
porate debtor's filing for bankruptcy. 237 Specifically, the outside creditor ex-
ercised no control over the debtor corporation; therefore, the creditor was
not an insider under section 101(30)(B)(iii).238 As noted in Deprizio, the
policy behind the extended preference recovery period created by section 547
avoids the costly monitoring of insiders by the outside creditors.239 Addi-
tionally, the Seventh Circuit held that an outside lender that secures a loan
with insider guarantees, in fact assumes the risk of recapture of payments
under the extended inside preference period. 24° As the Fifth Circuit noted in
Compton, however, the risk of insolvency does not equate with the risk of a
preference attack. 241 Quite the contrary, Congress intended section 547 to
protect from preference attack, the non-inside creditor that receives a trans-
fer from a debtor outside the ninety-day period before the filing of a bank-
234. This analysis would not save the creditor in Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L
Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990). In the Ray case, the bank was not a creditor of
the debtor corporation. Instead, the court held that the insider had personally borrowed the
money and then loaned it to his corporation or that the bank loaned the money to Cartage
with the insider's acting as an artificial conduit to guarantee the loan. Id. The insider then
caused the debtor corporation to make payments on a personal loan which were deemed a
preference to the insider. Id. Because the insiders were creditors corporation, the payments to
the third party bank were for the benefit of the inside creditor and thus subject to preference
recovery. Id. The bank arguably had no defense in equity since, unlike the typical insider
guarantee situation in which the bank requests or obtains the insider guarantee in lieu of a
security interest, the insider had secured his loan from the bank with several certificates of
deposit.
235. See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
236. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-79.
237. See infra note 4-6 and accompanying text. Cf CHG Int'l, Inc. v. Barclays Bank
(Matter of CHG Int'l, Inc.), 897 F.2d 1479, 1482-86 (9th Cir. 1990) (debtor's payments on
long-term debt not made in ordinary course of business).
238. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (30)(8)(iii) (1988).
239. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186,
1195 (7th Cir. 1989).
240. Id.





The Seventh Circuit in Deprizio also noted that a lender can transfer the
risk or insure itself against exposure to the extended preference period by
raising the interest rate charged on loans guaranteed by corporate insid-
ers.243 This contention ignores the commercial purpose that closed corpora-
tion insiders have in making guarantees for corporate loans: obtaining
reasonable interest rates.
Instead, the literalist approach appears to create a tension between the
closed corporation and lenders. While the corporation wishes to secure
credit at reasonable rates, the outside lender wants greater security than the
limited liability provided by the corporate form. Corporate insiders offer
personal guarantees to the outside lender in exchange for a reasonable inter-
est rate on the corporate note. The lender, under the literalist approach, is
forced to charge a higher interest rate in order to compensate for a possible
preference attack on all payments made upon the note within a year of cor-
porate bankruptcy. Regardless of the Seventh Circuit's concession that the
defenses under section 547(c) are available to the outsider, 2" defending such
a right, merely because an insider guaranteed a loan, is costly.
The Seventh Circuit provided the alternative that a lender could monitor
insiders.245 Ignoring the cost or logistics of such a proposal, this suggested
monitoring could lead to a debate concerning whether the outside lender
exercised control over the debtor; and consequently, the lender would be-
come exposed to additional liability as an accidental partner of the busi-
ness.246 Even if the lender avoids any liability problems and can absorb the
costs of monitoring, the corporation could suddenly suffer an unanticipated
financial blow, leading again to a preference problem if the corporation be-
comes insolvent.
Finally, the specific purpose of the extended insider preference period is to
avoid creditor misbehavior by the debtor's insiders.247 The literalist ap-
proach fails to discourage such behavior, and may actually encourage it by
penalizing the outside creditor. For example, when an insider knows of the
financial problems facing its corporation, and the outside lender is the major
creditor of the corporation, the literal approach encourages the insider to
prefer the outsider for three reasons: (1) to cut-off future pressure from unin-
formed outside creditors; (2) to mislead other creditors regarding the finan-
cial health of the corporation; and (3) to lower the insider's exposure on the
guarantee.
At the same time, the insider's own financial solvency most likely is linked
242. Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n (Matter of Midwestern Co.), 96 Bankr.
224, 228 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988).
243. Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1198.
244. Id. at 1199.
245. Levit v. Ingersoll Fin. Corp. (In re V. N Deprizio Const. Co.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1194
(7th Cir. 1989).
246. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
247. See Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assoc. (Matter of Midwestern Co.), 102
B.R. 169, 173 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
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to the corporation's financial health. Once that health begins to deteriorate,
the corporation might file bankruptcy. The trustee, under the literalist ap-
proach, could seek recovery of payments to an outside creditor, made within
ninety days to one year before the bankruptcy. After suffering the prefer-
ence attack of the trustee, the outside lender may try to seek payment from
the inside guarantor who, under this hypothetical situation, is as insolvent as
the corporation. The insider, thus, would gain the advantages of making the
preference and would suffer no penalty. The preference law, therefore, ar-
guably fails to prevent the insider's misbehavior by not penalizing the actual
culprit.
B. Statutory Construction
Examining the structure of the Code in light of the legislative history of
section 550(a)(1), demonstrates that Congress did not intend the conclusion
reached by the literal approach.248 Section 550 provides for two different
classes of transferees. 249 Section 550(a)(1) makes liable the initial transferee
or beneficiary of an avoided transfer.250 Normally, either the initial trans-
feree or the beneficiary is the creditor for purposes of section 547(b)(1), and
as such, may look to that section for protection from liability.251 If the
transfer is not avoidable, the creditor is not liable.252
Section 550(a)(2) empowers the trustee to recover subsequent transfers.253
The trustee's power to recover a transfer under Section 550 is limited, how-
ever, "to the extent that a transfer [can be] avoided under ...Section
547."254 Section 550(b) provides additional restrictions on this power.255
First, section 550(b) protects a later transferee when the transferee takes for
value in good faith and without awareness of the voidability of the trans-
248. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a), (b) (1988).
249. 11 U.S.C. § 550(aXl) (1988).
250. See State v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 609 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (determination of partnership based on facts and circum-
stances); see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6, 6 U.L.A. official comments at 23 (1918) (con-
tract unnecessary to form partnership).
251. The leaders of the legislative development of the Code noted: "The liability of a trans-
feree under section 550(a) applies only 'to the extent that a transfer is avoided.' This means
that liability is not imposed on a transferee to the extent that a transferee is protected under a
provision such as section 548(c) .. " 124 CONG. REC. S17,406, S17,414 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978) (statement of Sen. DeConicini), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6506,
6527; 124 CONG. REC. H11,089, Hi1,097 (daily ed. Sept 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Ed-
wards), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6436, 6457.
252. A protection afforded a creditor under section 547, if the creditor is a non-insider,
limits the trustee to attacking transfers made within ninety days before the debtor filed bank-
ruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 547. The literal approach to the insider-guarantor situation destroys this
protection. See Block v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Assoc. (Matter of Midwestern Co.), 102
Bankr. 169, 172-73 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
253. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(2) (1988).
254. 11 U.S.C. 550(a) (1988).
255. See infra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
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fer.256 Furthermore, the Code protects subsequent good faith transferees. 257
Faced with the insider guarantor/outside lender preference situation, the
bankruptcy court in Midwestern 258 took note of the structure of the Code,
holding that, even if the language of section 550(a)(1) is unambiguous, the
court must interpret the statute under the traditional cannons of statutory
construction. 259 Courts should, when reasonable to do so, interpret statutes
to give them effectiveness as a whole. 260 Whether construing contracts or
statutes, the general rules of construction provide that specific provisions
control over general provisions.26' Using such fundamental cannons of con-
struction, the bankruptcy court read the specific provisions of section 547
against avoidance, and hence recovery, from outside creditors more than
ninety days before bankruptcy, as taking precedence over the general section
550(a)(1). 262 Instead, the bankruptcy court in Midwestern held that the lan-
guage "initial transferee" should be interpreted to mean the initial transferee
to whom the transfer was preferential. 263
The bankruptcy court found this construction inherent in the construction
of section 550.264 Noting that section 550 allows a transferee other than an
initial transferred a defense of "good faith", 265 the court reasoned that the
only purpose behind such a distinction was the United States rule of disre-
garding the intent of the debtor making a preference. 266 The court thus con-
cluded that among the defenses accorded the outside lender was the defense
that the transfer was not preferential to it as the initial transferee. 267
256. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (1988). Although the statute left the meaning of good faith to
the courts to define, the Commission did state that good faith would clearly not be present if
the transferee was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the prop-
erty was recoverable. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 180 (1973) [hereinafter the Commission
Report].
257. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(2). This good faith protection is common to many other commer-
cial transactions. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1987) (good faith purchaser obtains valid title
from seller with voidable title); id. § 3-404(1) (unauthorized signer of commercial instrument
liable to good faith payor); id. § 9-307(2) (good faith purchaser of consumer goods takes free of
security interest).
258. 96 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd 102 Bankr. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
259. 96 Bankr. at 225.
260. Id (quoting 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes § 249, p. 422 (2d ed. 1974)) which states:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statutes. Hence, it is a
general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so, interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation
and effect as a whole. An interpretation should be avoided under which the
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nulli-
fied, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignifi-
cant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
261. Midwestern, 96 Bankr. at 225.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 226.
264. Id
265. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
266. Id. See supra notes 41-70 and accompanying text.
267. Id. at 227. See the Commission Report, supra note 256, at 179, suggesting that Con-
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In further support of this construction, the bankruptcy court pointed to
the literalist courts' concession that the outside creditor could use the section
547(c) defenses.268 If the Deprizio court's literalist approach failed to recog-
nize the 547(c) defenses, the court compromised the initial premise that no
ambiguity existed in the statutes.269 This is necessarily so because a latent
ambiguity arises concerning why the statute purportedly denies only initial
transferees the defenses available under section 547(c). 270 Accordingly, the
Midwestern court held that the outside lender could defend based upon the
fact that the trustee may attack as preferential, only those payments made
ninety days or closer to the filing date of the debtor's petition. 271
As both the bankruptcy court and the affirming district court in Midwest-
ern noted, the Deprizio court's literalist approach fails to distinguish an
outside lender from an insider.272 The Midwestern district court correctly
emphasized the conditional language of section 550 that limits the recovery
of the trustee to the extent the transfer is avoidable under section 547.273
Under section 547, the trustee can avoid the transfer to a creditor if: (1)
the debtor made the transfer on or within ninety days before the filing of the
petition; or (2) between ninety days and one year before the filing of the
petition, if the creditor was an insider at the time of the transfer. 274 Con-
struing the provisions of sections 547 and 550 together, and giving full effect
to both section, the district court held that the trustee may recover from
"the initial transferee (or the one whose benefit the debtor made the transfer)
if the transfer occurred between 90 days and one year before bankruptcy and
if that transferee was an insider. '275 This construction provides the express
protection of section 547 to non-inside creditors: the trustee can avoid or
recover only those transfers made within ninety days before the debtor files
the petition. 276
gress intended all transferees to receive equal protection, except those singled out for special
treatment in the separate avoidance sections. The Commission Report noted: "The treatment
of initial and subsequent transferee varies in each of the sections; some variation is justifiable as
to the initial transferee, but it is not as to subsequent transferee. Variances required as to the
treatment of initial transferee are handled in the avoidance sections." Id Section 547(b) is one
such separate avoidance section.
268. Midwestern, 96 Bankr. at 227. See supra notes 147-53, 195, 204 and accompanying
text (discussing that literal approach courts allow section 547(c) defenses).
269. 96 Bankr. at 221.
270. Id.
271. Id at 228.
272. Id. at 227; Midwestern, 102 Bankr. at 173.
273. Id. at 173.
274. Id. at 170.
275. Id. at 172.
276. As the court stated in Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19 Bankr. 843
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982):
Section 550(a)(1) was not intended to expand the trustee's right to recover pref-
erences as provided in section 547, but was intended only to facilitate his recov-
ery of transfers avoidable under section 547, regardless of whether the transfer
as effected through a number of parties or effected indirectly for the benefit of
the party who actually benefited form the preference.




The majority of bankruptcy courts encountering the preference problem
of an outside lender, holding guarantees from insiders, concluded that an
outside lender is not liable for the extended preference period of an insider.
The majority generally has reached this conclusion on the basis of equity. A
minority of decisions, including recent appellate decisions, held the opposite.
The leading case from the Seventh Circuit based its reasoning on the plain
meaning of the statute. Both approaches suffer from an incorrect focus on
section 550(a)(1).
This Comment argues that, by reading in context both Section 547 and
550, by considering the purposes behind preference law, and by correctly
employing the cannons of statutory construction, one logically concludes
that the outside lender does not increase its exposure to the preference laws
merely by obtaining a guarantee from a corporate insider. A separate legal
determination of the creditor's status as an insider is necessary before apply-
ing the statutory extension of the trustee's powers. This Comment's analysis
does not suggest that the courts rely on limited equitable powers, or on an
incorrect application of the indirect/direct transfer analysis to obtain an eq-
uitable result for both borrower and lender. Instead, an outside lender can
defend against recovery because section 547 limits a trustee's recovery from
outsiders to transfers made within the ninety days preceding bankruptcy.
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